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In his own teasing, amiable. but nonetheless formidable way, A. D. Hope continues his
skirmishing with the critics. of which he has always been one. How much of the poet
is in the critic, and the critic in the poet, is aquestion worth raising, and it's disappointing
that no-one in the books under review seems to have thought so.
Hope's 'On the Night Shift' (wuuldn't you, whoever you are, like to have thought
of that title?) is about one of his favourite suhjecLs~reams. In sleep the poet drcams
away his anxieties and enjoys his fantasics:
Dreams full of colour and light that change and glow
And unfulfilled love now made up to mc.
What a temptation thatlinc is tu critics, and I suppose, biographcrs. Why would a poct
who has written explicitly ahuut sensuality and sex, and also about love (in its physical
expression) as transcendent, dream abuut 'unfulfilled lovc'?
One thing is certain. Criti-:s who are determined to surt Hopc out won't succeed in
throwing light on the contradictions and mysteries in his personal. scholarly, poetic,
critical and pedagugic life if they keep on trying ncw labels. or dissecting him into ncat
and manageable portions, in thc hope that something, for bcttcr or worse, can bc said
with an air of dccisiveness.
Security ofAllusion is a collection uf five essays in honour of Hope. That this bouk
reached publication is amazing, and David Brooks deserves sympathy for trying over
a long period to elicit essays for his collection. including from me. Apologies arc in
order. Ann McCulloch, I lope 's hiographer, contributes a lecturc she gave on the evc of
his eightieth birthday. Her sul>ject is Hope's notebooks, from which shc cxtract.';,
sumewhat at randum, a numl>eroftoplcs 'that seem to me most interesting'. First on hcr
list is 'Negative Capahility', ufwhich shc give an aecount so far removed frum llopc's
starting point in Keats that I wondered whether she had unwittingly passed on to another
subject. She writes:
I think Hope hclieves that to adopt the perspective ofncgativl: capability, which
is to trcat all knowledge as provisional, is not only a creative one for a writcr but
a hcalthy one for thc human being who wishes to be happy.
Negative capability as a recipe fur happiness is a novel idea.
I do not for one moment undcrestimate the difficulty of writing Hopc's biography,
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especially since over many years he has sent out confusing signals about what he
remembers. Further, he has created some powerful legends about himself, in 'Ascent
into lIell' and 'Meet Nurse', for example. Unlike McAuley, he translates 'memory into
metaphor', which is not to say that the memory is faulty, but that the poet insists on its
significance in a way that might well command the biographer's assent, when what is
needed is healthy scepticism. A comparison of 'Ascent into Hell' and McAuley's
'Because' reveals more than tempcramental and experiential differences. Two different
concepts of poetic truth are in play.
Ann McCulloch, on the evidence of this lecture, does not inspire confidence in her
ahility to surmount the immense difficulties presented by so prolific and evasive a
writer. If she had entered "opc's dream world in 'On the Night Shift' it might well have
been as Little Red Riding Hood wandering through the forest to her grandmother's
house.
In the same collection Susan McKeman on 'Science and the Poetry of A. D. Hopc'
has a good subject, but reduces Hopc's forays into science to a somewhat pcdestrian
reconciliation of poetry and science. At the same time she evades the question of the
quality of his poems dealing with quasi-scientific subjects, to the point where 'The
Death of the Bird' and 'Phallus' are said to be based on 'scientific attitudes' and
therefore to have something (I know not what) in common with 'lmperial Adam' and
'The Wandering Islands'. The question that needs to be asked is whether or not the
poems dealing with scientific material are in any sense about science. I lope's persistent
habit of analogy frequently appcars in disguise; and the poems Susan McKernan reads
as evidence of his scientific interests or knowledge do not respond to this interpretation.
They are no more ahout science than 'Vivaldi, Bird and Angel' is about Vivaldi or
music; or, for that matter, 'Moschus Moschiferus' is about the musk·deer, or 'The
Cetaceans' about comparative anatomy. "opc's is popular science, and serves a
purpose similar to his recreation of ancient myths. Both enable him to speculate and
generalise. Transformation and adaptation, througb devices such as analogy and
parody, are his stratagems; and his range of reading in the cla.ssics, philosophy.
psychology. ancient history. mythology, science and medical history is to his poetry
what Alexander Selkirk's expedition was to Defoe-an ore body to be mined and
refined for his own purposes.
Kevin Hart approaches Ilopc through the modernising language of contemporary
criticism. ' "A. D. I lope" ',he writes, 'is the name of a man, the signature appended to
a work, and the index of a problem.' One can say amen to that without being confident
that it portends new insights or illuminations. In fact lIart tries very hard to provide a
guide to Hopc's poetic journey which, characteristically, begins with the poem 'The
End of the Journey'. In Ulysses' mind when he returns at last from his voyages arc
memories of the expcriences which are the mythological basis of Hopc's poems.
Ulysses hears the siren voices mocking him, singing their 'delusive song'. Is I lope, like
him a castaway?
Kevin Hart decides to relieve "opc of the burdens of earlier critical terminology,
and in particularofthe romantic/classicallahels. But he seizcs upon another label which
is just as troublesome-more so in that it demands a difficult explanation. The sirens
have led him into this trap, to the point of convincing him that 'desire. art and death .
are the main themes of "ope's poetry'. This is not untrue, but il is reductive. When Hart
decides that Hope is an Orphic writer he wades into deep waleI', relying on McAuley
to keep him afloat. McAuley refers to the 'Orphic vision of cosmic order and mythic
pattern'. Hart adds 'the affirmation of the primacy of poetry and its regenerative
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power' -an addition of which McAuley would have disapproved, and which Orphism
is not usually expected to embrace. The principal problt:m, however, is that the concept
of Orphism, if it applies at all, leaves large tracts of Hope's verse unaccounted for. Hart
is right to raise these questions, but he evades their implications, and so his account of
Hope, for all its detailed comparisons of poetry and criticism, and its expositions of
some important poems, keeps the critical questions at some ann's length. What is the
nature of Hope's achievemenl.';? How does one account for the persistence of the
distinctive 'voice' of the poet within the apparent fonnality of the verse?
Vincent Buckley's 'Verse and the Vernacular' (in Security ofAllusion), modestly
subtitled 'Notes on A. D. Hope', is tantalisingly incomplete. It focuses on Hopc's
language, and then begins to develop an argument about 'fixity of form'. After a mere
page, referring to the 'The Coasts ofCerigo' and 'Moschus Moschiferus', Buckley says
'Both poems, and many others, arc conceived in pattern and perfonned in freedom'.
Then, with masterly timing, he adds 'I would prefer to leave the matter there'; which
he does.
Where he'd have taken it we shall never know"and cannot try to guess. But
something can be added.llopc' s poetic voice ranges between relaxed colloquialism and
elevated rhetoric. 'What pleasure have great princes?' he asks, and, not expecting an
answer from his audience (which is sometimes a congregation), provides it himself in
a tone somewhere between an oration and a lecture.
I have never understood why some critics describe Hope a~ an Augustan poet, or
see him as an imitator of Pope. In Pope's poems variation of mood and tone are more
subtly indicated and his couplel.'; are more flexible. Hope's breadth of learning is
extraordinary, as is his ahiltty to read in a number of languages. His memory (as he is
ready to admit, not al ways aCl:urate) provides him with references which are often near-
quotations, and these sometime produl:e the effect of parody which in turn deflects him
from total seriousness. One notices too how often his syntax is fractured or incomplete
in, for example, 'Australia' and 'W. B. Yeats' .In both poems the effect is a dislocation
of logic which suggests levels of meaning beyond the literal. It's a rudimentary or
frustrated symbolic gesture.
Elevation of language is another way in which he seeks to report on the experienl:e
of transcendence. 'Ine early work "Ine Lamp and the Jar' is an example of a somewhat
strenuous reaching for the stars. In the later 'Ode on the Death of Pius the Twelfth' he
resorts to a list of questions with a distinctly catechistic flavour. In 'A Leller from
Rome' his attempt to ex plain the inex plicable experience at Nemi dissolves into a series
of rhetorical questions, and then into a set of statements; and the whole episode is
referred back to Byron. Faced with mysteries, McAuley writes 'Very little can he said'.
Hope says too much, and loses the mystery by mOVing too close for enlightenment to
'cold philosophy' .
In A. D. Hope: SeleCled P(lems. David Brooks has made an excellent choice of
poems. His introduction, though brief, starts productive new lines of thought. To he able
to take a fresh view of samples of his poetry from The Wandering Islands (1955 but in
fact including earlier decades) up to 1991l:oncentrates the mind wonderfull y. Time and
again Hope organises the reader's responses with his opening line.
Make no mistake; there will he no forgiveness.
You cannot build hridges between the wandering islands.
Sec how she strips her lily from the sun.
She was a great lady and wiser than men knew.
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And if not in the first line, it's not long before he is asserting, speculating, questioning,
proposing, criticising, or leading one on to an ironic, inconclusive end. The poet as
conductor, might be an appropriate description.
What I now wonder is how much the return journey to Hope yields hy way of
surprises and new discoveries. For all its extraordinary learning (usually worn lightly),
and its intellectual ardour and curiosity, there is little resonance in the poetry. It doesn't
insinuate itself into the imagination and lodge there for the memory to hring forward.
Hopc's lyrical gift is, as it were, restrained by the weight of his talent for the discursive
mode. But it shines out, sometimes a little tentatively as in 'William Butler Yeats', and
occasionally hauntingly, in 'Meditation on a Bone', 'As Well as they Can' and
'Aubade' .
Are these glimpses of the man behind the mask? One hardly dare ask the question,
in l:ase it be mistaken for a rhetorical one. There are no certainties to be discovered, in
spite of Hope's mostly authoritative tone. When in 'On the Night Shift' he finally sees
off his assorted dream cast of benign and sinister actors, he wakes up to offer somc
insights to the critics:
Bright chaps who mostly guess awry
Since ignorant of the way poems hegin.
These 'chaps' appcar in broad daylight with notebooks and microphones, asking dumb
qucstions about 'inspiration' and 'creative energy' and 'writers who have innuenced
you'. Strange that he should deride the very questions upon which his poetry so often
dwells.
Leonie Kramer
Christine Brooke-Rose, Storie., tlaeorie. and tlaing., Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Christinc Brooke-Rose's first essay in criticism, A Grammar nf Mctaphor, made a
timely appearance in 1958, when the Anglo-American academic world was in reaction
against the pieties of the 'New Critics' and 'practical criticism'. Not only was there a
broad and interdisciplinary interest in myth and metaphor as wgnitivc and l:ultural
phenomena, but an 'objective', taxonomic approach to literature was becoming
popular: works as e1cments and elcments of works werc considered as parts of a whole
(often synchronic), and criticism was urged to hase itself on an 'inductive leap ... the
same as any science: the assumption oftotal coherence'. This last is an exhortation from
pcrhaps the most significant of all such studies: Northrop rrye's AnaJomy nfCrilici.HII
(1957). Marjorie Boulton's The AnaJomy ofDrama was to appear in 1960; Wayne C.
Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction in 1961.
By 1981. however, the year in which Brooke-Rose published A Rhetoric nft/re
Unrcal, interest in this type of study had waned (largely hecause of obvious affinities
with Continental structuralism), cven though this second essay has the virtue of
anticipating many of the issues in thc still lively debate about poslrnodernism.1t is not
the only occasion on which its author has found or finds hcrself caught between camps
which threaten 'to quarter or sexter mc' (p.3), as she points out in the opening chapter
of Stories, theories and things A British novelist, born in Gcneva and living in France,
Christine Brooke-Rose writes experimental (postmodern?) fiction in a decidedly
non-British (ContinentaUrrcnch) tradition, for example. She is also a literary theorist
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who for twenty ycars was Profcssor of America" Literature at the University of Paris
(V ill). An independent woman who seeks 'the deep-<lown regeneration of the novel'
in part in 'the feminist revolution', she also explicitly disowns what she calls tbe
feminists' obligation currently 'to pounce on the pballocratic instances and to claim and
sometimes shriek their specificity' (pp.176-180).
As well as her professedly problematic 'relationship, as author, with literary
theory', moreover, there is a problematic relationship between her practice and her
allegiances as a literary critic. For while her talents lie with the minute and rigorous
discrimination ofgranunatical/ linguistic/rhetorical forms, 31Id with their reclassification
in line with are-cognition of their construction and!or function, Brooke-Rose repeatedly
adverts to the critical limitations of the stylistic analysis at which she excels. Though
systematic, her method neither derives from nor aspires to any system a~ such. Quite
the opposite. Any systematic approach to literary phenomena-narratology, for
example-sheexplicitly eschews as likely to become 'as self-reflexive as a "posunodern"
novel' and to tum 'into an endless discussion of how to speak of' those phenomena
(p.27). Though much of her own critical work has been and still is in the formalist and!
or structuralist mode, she is also quick to condemn structuralism's masculinist
'totalization, or construction of a whole' as 'always based on exclusions' (p.179), and
to tum on the quasi-scientific earnestness of semiotics:
There have !leen a few delightful moments, during my desultory and decidedly
non-expert readings in semiotics, when the subject made me laugh out loud
instead of terrorizing, or, same thing perhaps. boring me stupid (p.237)
At the level of critical theory, as it turns out, her affinities lie with post-structuralist
disestahlishmentarianism, or with its emotional and intellectual priorities (its
recalcitrance, scepticism and, in the older sense, 'wit'). as well as with its necessary
incompletion ('the pas tout being on the feminine side', p.179). Certainly etymology,
submerged quotation, and 'preuy paranomasia' llear a good deal of argumentallve
responsibility:
So we feign to form fictions with figments, sjuzhets without ajabu/a which comes
fromjari. to speak. We count and recount what we have counted, we recite and
cite ourselves in justice. we cut ourselves in pieces to play. we sing beside the
note ... we narrate therefore we know. we dramatize therefore perform. conform,
transform, form without informing, in brief ra cause because che cosa? (p.166)
Precisely because she is a rebel with a cause. however. her relations with Derridaean
deconstruction are alsu strained, identifying rather with the defamiliarizing strategies
and subversive gestures that it shares with a variety ofother Romantic and postRomantic
thought. than with its implicit or potential nihilism: 'Here, perhaps, lies our hope: a
starting again, ex almost "ihi/o' (p.178)
Christine Brooke·Rose's respect for the work of Ann Banfield is. unequivocally,
what she would ask for her uwn critical method-and what I. for one. would
unequivocally offer:
in so far as Banfield is dealing with sentences, as opposed to broad structures, her
highly knowledgeallie use of linguistics is fully operative. It is also important to
know that she is a literary critic who has mastered linguistics, not a linguist who
applies linguistics to literature, often without the sensitivity of a literary critic
(p.73 n.3)
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Her own 'higbly knowledgeable use of linguistics', with an acute sensitivity to deixis
or the situational indices of speech, is equally 'operative' throughout this often erratic
but always interesting collection of nineteen essays. All but three of them have been
published elsewhere, but the quite extensive modification of two or three extant essays
and tbe careful-sometimes overcareful--cross-referencing, not to speak of Brooke-
Rose's own characteristically divided critical persona, ensure that the whole has
enough 'coherence' to justify their collective publication. And af a collection, if we
ignore the occasional sub-Barthesian and sub· Derridaean self-indulgence, it is always
interesting and sometimes acutely, finely provocative.
Along with the analytical rigour of the linguist and grammarian, moreover,
there is ample evidence in Christine Brooke-Rose's Stories. theories and things of her
'baving thought long and deeply' as an 'interested' practioner and liberal educalionalist
about certain critical issues todo with the future of the novel. Her 'thoughts', moreover,
'are the representatives of all [her) past feelings' (to adapt Wordsworth), especially of
an irrepressible feeling that the novel is not only doing all right, thank you very much,
but will continue to do so because it satisfies certain formal needs that she hesilales to
theorize. Indeed, in most of the stories, theories, and things that she discusses, it is the
novelist who wins out over the theoretician in a number ofsubtle ways, and the aUlhnrity
of Barthes surrenders ultimately 10 the authority of Barth.
William Christie
Richard Freadman and Lloyd Reinhardt (eds). On Literary Theory and
Philo.ophy: A Cro..·Di.ciplinary Encounter, London: Macmillan, 1991.
On Literary Theory and Philosophy is a collection of essays that, the edilors lell us,
derives from a conference held at the University of Sydney in 1989. It is divided into
two parts: in Part One eight papers are grouped into four 'exchanges' under the
headings, 'self, 'ethics', 'interpretalion', and 'language'; in Part Two there arc three
essays on an uncategorised variety of topics; the whole is introduced with an ~ssay by
the editors.
Immediately we are faced with the question, What, if anything, holds this collection
of essays together, apart from their external connexion to the confer~nc~? In the
introduction the editors struggle to oUlline a general conception of a joint suhject-maller
which all the participants are supposed to be addressing. But while this conceplion may
have been the idea of the conference. it docs not seem to me to offer any very sharply
focussed topic that could give unity to a book. We are not told that all the essays were
presented as papers at the conference. and I cannot help wondering whether in fal:lth~y
all were. Christopher Norris's essay on how not to read Derrida, for example, has lhe
appearance of a review article on books by John M. Ellis and Derrida. Was il conlribuled
to the volume after the conference?
These speculations would have no importance were it not for the issue of the
coherence of the book, where coherence is the condition of a methodical exploration of
a subject.
The purpose of the conference was, we arc told, to provide an opportunity for a
'cross-disciplinary encounter', and to explore the possibility of 'dialogue' between
different positions in literary theory and philosophy. But right from the heginning lhe
definition of the opposition belween the two sides and indeed the definition of the two
sides themselves is problematical. The editors themselves recognize lhis, and arc
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suitably tentative and modest in giving their account of the intellectual framework into
which the following essays are supposed to fit. But the questions remain whether the
posited intellectual framework is anything more than a Procrustean Bed. and whether
the account of it is not more obscuring than clarifying. On the one side we have the
literary theory that has been fashionable now for some twenty years. the literary theory
that is inspired by Derrida and Foucault., and that looks back to Nietzsche and
Heidegger. and to an extent Freud. I think we may refer to this as poststructuralism,
althougb the editors do not. On the other side we have an alliance between analytical
philosopby and 'aesthetico·humanist' literary theory/criticism. How did this opposition
come to be constructed in the first place? At first I uncharitahly thought that the alliance
between analytical philosophy and aesthetico·humanist literary theory was only a
reflection of the fact that Freadman is a professor of English and Reinhardt an analytical
philosopber. Howeverthere is more to it than that. Self-defining analytical philosophers
have for years now seen themselves as in opposition to what they refer to as 'continental
philosophy'. More recently literary theorists of the DerrideanIFoucaultian kind have
claimed that analytical philosophy and aesthetico-humanist literary criticism share
certain basic assumptions. So it seems that two oppositions constructed from different
points of view are being conflated or superimposed on each other. We must imagine the
editors of this volume as being willing to enter the fray with their opponents on a site
constructed partly by themselves and partly by those very opponents. It is as though
Reinhardt. as the representative of analytical philosophy. accepts the alliance with
aesthetico-humanist literary criticism that poststructuralism thrusts upon him; and
Freadman, as the representative of aesthetico-humanist literary criticism. similarly
accepts the alliance with analytical philosophy. The question is, should anyone else
accept this pattern of opposing forces? Although Freadman and Reinhardt express
doubts about the rigidity of the distinctions involved in setting up these positions, they
do finally allow them to stand. At this point I may as well declare my own interest. In
literary criticism I side with Lcavis, and in social theory and history I side with Marx.
As Freadman and Reinhardt put Lcavis on one side of their opposition and Marx on the
other. I find it difficult to accept their 'map' of the terrain upon which we are all
supposed to be engaged. But it is not just a matter of my sensibilities. Anyone who has
read Leavis carefully will realize that despite hiS overt hostility to tht:orizing his
assumptions about literature and criticism helong to ways of thinking associated
with phenomenology, existentialism, and 'philosophy of life' And both Leavis and
American New Criticism exhibit doctrines about literature that derive from Kant. What
could be more 'continental'? It is also ironic, surely, that 'aesthetico-humanist'
literary criticism should be so easily allied with analytical philosophy--analytical
philosophy, which for decades marginalized both ethics and aesthetics (or if we think
of it as going back to Locke, for centuries)? It seems to me that any conference designed
to explore the relations between the study of literature and the study of philosophy
should be set up as at least a three-cornered discussion (say. analytical philosophy.
poststructuralism. literary criticism) so that the philosophical affiliations of non-
poststructuralist literary study are not taken for granted by the institutionalizing of
the debate.
'Dialogue' or 'debate '? I think the editors are a little too detached about this. Surely
'dialogue' (which is the tenn they usc) implies a l:O-operative venture with a view to
arriving at some measure of agreement? 'Debate' implies something more aggressive,
the possibility of victory and defeat. In fact., the four exchanges in the first part of the
book all turn into conflicts, so 'debate' would seem to be the more appropriate term
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And indeed it is difficult to see how dialogue could occur-for several reasons. First,
the framework of the discussion constructs the two sides in so vague a manner that
nothing very definite could emerge from their interaction. Second, when we examine
the actual exchanges. we find that the participants do not always want to engage with
one another. They will make theirown decIarations: they will tryoutflankingmanoeuvres:
they will attack their opponents in the rear: they wiJI in fact do anything but engage
closely with what their interlocutors have said. I exaggerate slightly, but not very much.
Finally, does not dialogue require at least two exchanges? In the four discussions that
make up Part One the first speaker has his or her say, and the second speaker responds
(not always very directly). The first speaker has no opportunity to respond to the
second's criticism, nor the second to reply again. The most that we get is a statement
of two positions and a partial criticism of one of them. This is not very illwninating. I
am afraid that this book docs rather demonstrate what one might have predicted in
advance, viz. that dialogue requires a common language and common preoccupations.
Where these conditions do not exist, dialogue is not possible. People speak at each other
across empty spaces. The only engagement possible is at the most fundamental level
where the tenns of debate arc 10 be set. Some of the participants in these exchanges
(generally the poststructuralists-who three times out of four have the position of
replying) recognize this. and take what their interlocutor has said as an occasion for
stating their own views. In this respect the book is depressing.
Setting aside the issue of dialogue. we may consider the quality of the individual
essays. In this respect. as might be expected. the book is uneven. Richard Freadman and
Sewnas Miller question the validity of deconstruction as a mode of literary criticism
through a critique of Gayatri Spivak's commentary on The Prelude. While I am
sympathetic to their wish to defend the integrity of the experience emhodied in
Wordsworth's poem against insensitive disintegrations of it, it seems to me that their
reliance on the concept of authorial intention and their apparent rejection of any critical
discourse that is alien to the text heing criticised is in a strict sense reactionary (it goes
back behind the elucidations of the Intentional Fallacy to revive an untenahle position).
and obfuscates the theoretical issues involved in the relation of text and criticism. Ian
Saunders replies by distinguishing sensibly between word- and sentence-meaning on
the one hand and the 'meaning ofa text as a whole' on the other. The latter. he suggests.
is a mistaken notion: texts as a whole are to be construed in the light of readers'
particular interests and concerns. While this distinction is useful so far as it goes, it does
not engage with the issue that Freadman and Miller raise. viz. the status of the
experience that is emhodied in the text. Is this something that the reader has to discover,
or is it something that different readers may construct in different ways in relation
to their particular concerns and interests? If the latter does not seem very plausible.
then Saunders has glossed over a crucial issue about how texts ought 10 constrain the
rcadings of different readcrs.
Christopher Cordner makes what is in my opinion the most valuable conu'ihution
to the book in a paper that offers to theorizc a Lcavisite style of criticism as a moral
appraisal of an aliveness to the world that may involve what is unconscious as well as
conscious. and which is not necessarily concerned with the distribution of praise and
blame. Kevin Hart's response ignores Cordner's specific theory and trols out the usual
poststructuralist gencralities about pluralism and the avoidance of claims to centrality.
This cxchange shows that more is at issue here than ideas and argumenls. Hart professes
not to understand the sort ofclaims that Cordner would make of a literary work. and this
can only mean that Hart does not know the sort of experience in reading to which
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Cordner is referring. If this is true, then all Cordner's attempts to persuade Hart must
be futile from the outset.
Gregory Currie explores the nature of the interpretation of fiction in the context of
analytical philosophy' s accounl~ of truth-conditional semantics. This essay seemed to
me, of its very nature, to be of more value to analytical philosophy than to the study of
literature. Currie's positive is truth and meaning in the world of fact. The truth and
meaning of fiction are only considered negatively as what they are not in relation to
Currie's positive. This may fill in a comer of the analytical philosopher's theory of
truth-conditional semanlics, but from the point of view of the literary student the
positive nature of the work of fiction remains obscure. Anne Freadman' s response to
Currie is virtually to ignore everything Currie has said, and to take his assumptions as
a point of departure for expounding her own views. And so we get a poststructuralist
account of truth, meaning, discourse, and genres. Whatever this is, it is not dialogue. It
is hardly even debate.
Robyn Ferrell's paper is the first directly to address the basic connict between
analytical philosophy and deconstruction, which she docs by an analysis and discussion
of the Searle-Derrida debate of 1977. She offers adetailed criticism of Searle's
speech-act theory, and opposes Derrida's theory of differanct! to Searle's reference of
meaning to intentions. Stephen Gaukroger's incisive but hostile reply goes behind
Derrida (what else?) to make a critique of Saussure and Lacan (Dcrrida, we are to
suppose, falls with Saussure and Lacan). Gaukroger then offers to preserve and
supplement a truth-conditional semantics with a poetics modelled on that of Roman
Jakobson. Poslstructuralism's concern with literal and metaphorical meaning is
dismissed a~ of little interest. Gaukroger seems to argue that if the issues arc posed in
the correct way, then the problems to which poststructuralism is attached dissolve
away. Poststructuralism appears a~ yet another instance of acontinental philosophy that
is mistakenly concerned with pseudo-problems. If Gaulcroger is right, then dialogue
is out of the question.
Christopher Norris offers to defend Dcrrida from his disciples. In Norris's view,
Derrida has not abandoned generalised criteria of validity and truth, and we are to
suppose that dialogue is possible between Derrida and his opponents, because Dcrrida,
it seems, has been misunderstood. If this is meant to cheer us all up, I can only say that
I do not know which is the more appalling: that a major philosopher has been totally
misunderstood for twenty-five years, or that his disciples have uncomprehendingly
misrepresented him for the same length of time. lIorst Ruthrof asks direcLly. 'Is
dialogue possible?' And he offers to set out the terms on which it might be. I was
encouraged hy this paper unlil I realized that Ruthrof's view of the conditions of
dialogue is that analytical philosophy is to question its hasic assumptions, while
deconstruction is only to rephrase its views so that analytical philosophers can
understand them' Ruthrofs view of dialogue is. 'Of ooursc we can talk togelher,
provided you change your mind'. Finally, Alexander Nehamas offers a brilliant
exegesis of Nietzsche's changing views of reality and interpretation. This paper, in all
its brilliance, has nOlhing whatever to do with the rest of the book.
To sum up: the papers of Cordner and Nehamas are distinguished contrihutions to
the examination of their subjects; the paper ofCurrie is a useful exploration ofthe theory
of fiction from the standpoint of truth-conditional semantics: the papers of Saunders,
Ferrell, Gaukroger, and Norris serve the valuahle function of clarifying the issues at
stake in the conflict; hut the other papers do not seem to me to help the debate, in any
serious way. Overall, I think it has to be said that this book is more revealing of the
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theoretical perspectives of the different sides than it is illuminating of the issues that are
in question between them.
Is the dust-jacket of this book iconic? It is slashed between off-white and dirty- grey.
Does this signify that each side sees itself as not wholly good. and its opponent as not
wholly evil? Or is it a sign that the two sides are not separate, but have interpenetrated
each other? As I read through the book. I could not help thinking of what the two sides
have in common: the proclivity of both Derrideans and Wittgensteineans to treat
language as a game; the insistence on a formal notation of both analytical philosophy
and semiotics: and the hideous attachment to genres of both old-fashioned literary
philologists and new-fangled discourse-theorists. This reflection strengthenoo my
conviction of not wanting to choose between these two sides.
David Brooks
Clare Regan Kinney: Strategie. of Poetic Narrative: Chaucer, Spenller,
Milton, Eliot, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
As Clare Regan Kinney claims in the introductory chapter to Strategies of Poetic
Narrative. despite the enormous amount of recent writing on narrative very little uf it
has been directly about narrative poetry or even has included much reference to the
genre: most has been devoted to narrative prose fiction. Nevertheless, the narrative
poem is a major genre in English literature and, as she claims, 'few would deny that
[sophisticated examples of the genre) possess a narrative structure which (to quote a
contemporary narrative theorist) "communicates meaning in its own right. over and
above the paraphrasable contents of the story" • (p.3).
Kinney's book deals specifically with the narrative strategies for four poems, three
of which pre-date the novel: Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde. Spenser's The Faerie
Queene. and Milton's Paradise Lost. The fourth is Eliot's The Waste Land. included
here. it seems, mainly for its similarities in approach to the problems of poetic narrative
demonstrated. and solved, in various ways, by the other three; and also for the ways in
which it draws attention, by its apparently fragmentary story/ies, to its narrative means
and ends.
The book is devoted to separate, though linkoo, studies of each of the four poems.
In adopting this format. Kinney is able to outline a general thesis and illustrate it at
length and in great detail. The general thesis depends on elucidating the extreme
complexity of the first three poems she discusses and, more particularly. on the ways
in which they exhibit 'a striking degree of intertextuality: their narrative energy is
directed less towards the representation of any external reality ... than towards the
reappropriation and recreation of previous literary texts' (p.14).
Using this as the basis for her argument ahout the tirst three poems (and ahout The
Waste Land's fragmented intertextuality). Kinney demonstrates how the fact that each
is both poem and narrative (and hence resistant to a simple binary opposition of lyric!
narrative, or synchrony!diachrony) exemplifies in miniature-through the individual
line, the stanzaic pattern or groups of lines within the narrative-the ways in which the
poems use what she calls 'revisionary augmentation'. By this. she refers to the
overlaying of linear narrative progression with synchronic lyric. She argues that
Troilus and Criseyde and Paradise Lost both. obviously, refer to and recreate their
sources: Paradise Lost is a particularly voluminous recreation of a particularly laconic
source. In the case of The Faerie Queene she argues Ulat it does not so much revise its
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sources as itself: in its repetition of slnlctural patterns established in Book I and
between Books I and II, 'intertextuaJity collapses into inlratcxtuality'.
The endings of these poems are discussed as especially interesting for narrative
theory: poetic slnlctures of lines, and stanzas, and verse paragraphs constantly provide
'premature endings' and consequently complicate the diachronic plotting of the
narrative. Furthermore, the endings of Troi/us and Criseyde and Paradise Lost, because
already existent (in their sources), cause the poets to defer, delay and further complicate
any simple sense the reader might gather of diachronic narrative. The Faerie Queene's
ending (both the endofBook VI and the revised ending of the 'Mutabilitie Cantos', first
published in 1609) in its poetic strategies and in its narrative and allegorical suhject
disintegrated as the Blatant Beast roams unchecked, a supreme example (of many,
multiplied from Book to Book) of the misuse of words. Missayers and missaying cause
the disintegration ofCourtesy itself, barely redeemed by thl: addition of the 'Mutabilitie
Cantos' .
Kinney's argument, pursued with close allention to detail and very specific
reference, not only provides in itself an original and, sophisticated approach to the
poems, but has much to say about the way the poems work. She claims that her general
argument about 'the inherent doubleness of the poetic narrative ... must needs be a
tentative one' (p.191): nevertheless, in providing a broader approach to narrative than
most recent theory, she establishes a way of reading which, even in less complex
narrative poems than those treated here, will provide the basis for much further debate.
Mary Chan
David Holdcrort, Sauuure: Sign_, Sydem, and Arbitrarine.., Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
This book is the eleventh in a Cambridge series called 'Modem European Philosophy'.
In a slender volume, Holdcroft manages to combine a clear exposition of Saussure's
main tenets with a detailed critique of them from a viewpoint within Anglo-American
analytical philosophy. Occasionally this viewpoint seems to lead Holdcrofl off the
track, as, for example, when he wanders from the question of whether Saussure's
account of language change and acquisition is compatible with methodological
individualism to the question of whether David Lewis' account of convention is
compatible with it (pp.1 52-4) And sometimes (unwillingly it would seem) Holdcroft
'translates' Saussure into inappropriate Oxfordese, as when he uses 'sl:nsl:' as a
synonym for 'signification' (p IOH), or when he attributes to Saussure the view that 'one
l:annot explain why individuals speak the way they do without as\..Tibing to them f,diefs
[my emphasis) about a langul!' (p.154). But obvious intrusions such as these are
infrequent in the book, which is in any case lucid and engaging throUghl1Ul.
The book opens with a chapter on the historical context and sigmfil:ance of
Saussure's work. Holdcroft rightly stresses the extent to which the linguistics of
Saussurc's day was dominated by the comparative-historical method, and that his
emphasis on the synchronic was therefore innovative within the discipline: 'Now that
[Saussure's) views on this mailer have become the norm, it is difficult to appreciate
how both novel and revolutionary his position was, yet it unquestionably represented
a major shift in perspective ... '(p.I?).
As important a~ this has been for linguistics, in recent times the influence of
Saussure's Cours de linguislique genhale (1913, IT. Wade Baskin, New York, 1959)
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has been more evident outside of that field than within it, in the works of theorists such
as Claude Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan. Such interdisciplinary
cross-fertilisation is not unusual in the human sciences, but, as Holdcroft points out,
Saussure was unusual for the way in which he anticipated it, by, in principle, treating
his own area of investigation as a species of something more general:
A science that studies the life ofsigns within society is conceivable; .,. I shall call
it semiology (from the Greek semelon 'sign') ... Since the science does not yet
exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked
out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology; the
laws discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will
circumscribe a we II-defined area within the mass of anthropological facts (Colin,
1959, p.16).
The general thrust of the rest of the book, summarised in chapter 7, is that Saussure
succeeded in his objective ofrigorously circumscribing an object ofstudy for synchrunic
linguistics, but failed in his allempt to place it within the context of a more general
science of signs (the possibility of which Holdcroft is inclined to reject).
Chapters 2-6 of the book comprise a critical exegesis of Saussure's views on
general linguistics. This is an even more difficult task than exegesis of the published
Cours, because of the way in which the laller was posthumously compiled frum the
notes of Saussure's students. The notes (published in Engler's edition uf 19(7) come
from three different academic years in which the course was givt:n (1906-7, 19011-l),
1910-11), and we know from them that the organisation and contt:nt of tht: lectures
differed considerably from year to year. The editors of the original French edition say
they used 'the third course as a starting point' (Cour.~, p.xiv), but they departed
considerably from Saussure's order ofexposition. Where they differ, Holdcroft follows
Saussure's order in the third course rather than the editors' (to cunsiderahlt: advantage,
it seems to me). Thus the order of topics addressed (in Chapters 2-6 rt:spcctively) is:
'The distinction between langue and parole'; 'Signs, arbitrariness, linearity and
change': 'Diachronic and synchronic linguistics', 'Identities, system and relatiuns':
'Values, differences, and reality'.
In general, I find Holdcroft's exegesis clear and useful, and his criticisms well
argued if not always well founded. The main points on which I wuuld take issue with
his reading are as follows.
While I agree that the central question addressed hy Saussure in tht: Cours was
'What is the ubject of linguistics?'(p.16), I think Holdcruft does not take sufficient
account of one a~pect of Saussure's answer to that question, namely his axiom that in
linguistics, 'it is the viewpoint that creates the object' (Cours, p.8). lbus, Holdcroft,
even afterrightlyrecugnising that Saussure used the notion of 'language-state' as akind
of 'methodological fiction' (p.87), nonetheless refers to a putative assumption by
Saussure that 'there are [emphasis mine) such states' (ibid). Another example is
Holdcroft's claim that Saussure's 'arguments depended crucially on there ht:ing a
determinate system to reconstruct' . Some of the formulations in the puhlished COllrs
suggest this, but it is incompatihle with Saussure's avowed methodological
'perspectivism', according to which langue as 'determinate system' would have to he
seen as the artefact of a particular theoretical perspective, rather than as so:nething
which was already there to 'reconstruct'.
My second disagreement with Holdcroft concerns Saussure's distinction between
the syntagmatic axis and the associative, and its relation to his distinction hetween
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langue ('Ianguagc systcm') and parole ('speaking'). Holdcroft correctly glosses
'syntagmatic relation' as that which 'holds between lCrms which are "chained together",
so that syntagmatic rclations are se4uential' (p.98). He cites Saussure' s example of 'lhe
relation betwcen "re" and "read" in the syntagm "rc-rcad", so called because it is a
combination ofelements which are syntagmatically related' (ibid). Holdcroft then asks:
But is the fact that 'rc' and 'rcad' are related syntagmatically a fact ahoullangue
or one about parole? It would sccm that Saussure must givc the first answer;
otherwise, he would not be in a position to say in what way langue is a system. But,
somewhat disconcertingly, he writes as though it ill- because of the nature of
discourse that such relalions exist. Such a relation is, he says 'in praesemia. It is
ba.~ed on two or more terms that occur in an cffective series' [Cours, p.123). All
this suggests that syntagmalic rclations are, after all, facts of parole. (pp 9R-9)
Later on, when summarising the argument of this chapler, Holdcroft altrihutes to
Saussure the categoncal assertion that 'syntagmatic relations pertain to parole' (p.1 06).
But Saussurc certainly never assert~ this, and in my opinion he does not even
'suggest' it. To say that the syntagmatic relation is based on the occurrence of terms
combined in a serics in praesentia is by no mcans the same thing as to say that thc
relation itself is a 'fact of parole'. What makes such a series an 'effectivc' one, as
Saussureclearly recognised, is that it instantiates some regular 'syntagmatic type' (Collrs,
p.125)which is clearly a fact of langue. It is true that Saussure' s 'notionof[syntagmatic)
types was largely embryonic' (Holdcroft, p.I03) and that he could never 4uite see how
to extend it to most kinds of sentences (as opposed to phrases or complex words), hut
one should give him his due. In at lea.~t one respect his modelling of the paradigmatic!
syntagmatic contra.~twas more sophisticated than thatofmostofhis exegetes (including
Holdcrofl) and theoretical heirs (with the exception of Hjelmslcv and those who havc
been influenced by him in this rcspecl, such a.~ Halliday). That is, he clearly saw that
the syntagmatic types arc identifiable as such only insofar as they themselvcs enter into
paradigmatic relations (Cours, p.125), which determine their values within a given
language.
Despite his own grounding in philosophy, Holdcroft is generally well read in the
large secondary literature on Saussure by linguists and other semioticians, and carefully
situates his arguments with respect to it-mostly in footnotes where such discussion
belongs. There is, however, one surprising gap in this discussion: no mention at all is
made of what is prohably thc most important work of intellectual history in this area in
recent times, lIans Aarsleffs From Locke to Saussure, Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota, 1983 ).In a work of prodigious scholarship and radical revisionism, Aarsleff
argues that Saussure's linguistics was largely continuous with the tradition ofCondillac
and the ideologues, long suppressed for political reasons after IROO hut revi ved during
Saussure's formative years in Paris by, among others, Hippolyte Taine and the linguist
Michael Breal. Aarsleff argues that all of the major element~of the Saussurean model
were already present in these men's work, including the principles of linearity and
arbitrariness, conccpts of langue, parole, valeur, structure, hinary opposition,
syntagmatics, diachrony vs synchrony, and the double nature of the sign, for which
Taine in IR70 even offered the same metaphor as Saussure was later to use, that of the
verso and recto of a single sheet of paper.
It could of course he argued that none of this diminishes the importance of
Saussure's text as the synthetic locus classicus which suhsequent structuralists have
taken as their point ofdeparture. Aarsleffhimselfis willing to see it as 'that great summa
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which gave linguistics a new beginning'(p.!7) by importing ideas into the discipline
which had been develop.:d elsewhere (p.365). But one wonders how Holdcroft would
be able to reconcile AarslefC's evidence with his own claim that Saussure 'initiated a
radically new perspective in the study of language, a veritable Copernican revolution'.
As suggested by Aarsleff's characterisation of the Cours, the more apt comparison is
perhaps with Aquinas.
Another. perhaps less surprising gap in Holdcroft's treatment of other secondary
literature on Saussure is the absence of any serious consideration of french critiques
over the last twenty fivc ycars in a 'post-structuralist' or 'dcconstructionist' vein.
Kristeva's work is not mcntioned at all. and of Derrida's critique of Saussurc. the only
aspcctconsidercd by Holdcroft is his well-known argument against Saussure's privileging
of thc phonic medium over the graphic. But this argument is part and parcel of a much
more general critique of bipartite notions of the sign which Holdcroft would have done
well to consider, as it has much in common with his own critique of residual
'nomenclaturism' in Saussurc (pp.49-50).
Notwithstanding the length at which) havc dwelled upon my disagrecment<; with
1I0idcroft, ) think this book's omissions and wcak points are far outweighed by its
strong ones. Some of these arc:
1) The argument that. appearances notwithstanding. Saussure's model of the speech
circuit (with two talking heads. etc.) need not involve a reification of langue. if
taken as a model of language acquisition rather than of language competence (p.29).
2) Appreciation of thc importance for Saussure of the distinction between 'abstract
[mental) entities' and 'concretc' (ie. 'psychologically real') ones (pp.89-92). :md
its consequences for his approach to the qucstion of whether the sentence can be
treated as a syntagm (p.l 02).
3) The distinction betwccn 'having a valuc' and 'being a value'. and its usefulness for
assessing Saussure'sclairn that linguistic values arc purely negative and differential.
4) The way 1I0idcroft distinguishes among several different kinds of linguistic
motivation. and shows that Saussure's arguments for arbitrariness fail to take
account of any but the more trivial ones (pp.52-5).
5) The critique of Saussurc 's concept ofrelative motivation. which concedes too much
to non-arbitrariness. resting as it does 'on a confusion bctween the idea of
motivation and that of linguistic system' (p.56).
This list is far from completc but should help to givc some idea of thc scope of
1I0ldcroft's argument. Given the level at which it is pitched.) am not sure) would set
this book as introductory text (1. Culler. Saussurt!. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins. 1976 is
probably still preferable for that), but for anyone who has read Saussure and wants to
grapple seriously with the unresolved issues he still raises. Holdcroft is essential
reading.
Alan Rumsey
Virginia Spate, The CowurofTime: Claude Monel, Thames'" Hudson, 1992.
Some artists. likc Van Gogh. offer the biographer almost too much material; Monet
offers very little. !tis life was remarkablc mainly for the fad that he was a great painter
and not much he did or said helps to explain the decpest sense of his work. Morcover.
except in the evocation of the family (especially in his carlier painting), he W;IS a
strikingly impersonal artist. There is. for cxample. hardly a hreath of romantic I()\~
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or desire in his art, and equally absent is any overt sign of political or religious
commitment.
Perhaps this is not surprising, smce Monet's painting, although popularly thought
'accessible', works on a level of abstraction that is remote from everyday concerns.
Even his early work, with its ostensible interest in modem life, has none of ManeI' s or
Baudelaire's moral engagement with the subject. For Monet, modem life seems to mean
more than anything a certain kind of indolence appropriate to the detached vision to
which he aspires. In these picnics, or garden scenes, nothing of any importance is
happening, and the figures lend themselves entirely to their roles in a composition of
light effects. .
In any representational painting, each element of the image is also part of a
composition, part of a set of patterns that exist on the flat surface of the canvas. 'l1le
brushstroke itself is often visibly a brushstroke at the same time as it stands for
something else, and this is part of the aesthetic effect of the picture, just as the effect of
a poem is inseparable from the artificial order of metre. There is nothing intrinsically
modern about this eternal ambiguity, but Monet's early paintings systematically push
the point ofequilibrium further towards abstraction, so that we are constantly reminded
of the artificiality of the pictorial 'illusion'. This height~n~d ambiguity is used to
emphasize that it is light, not the motif that is his deepest concern.
In the works of his maturity, such as the series of wheat-stacks or of Rouen
cathedral, the opposition becomes unmistakeable. The repetition of the same motif in
very different pictures makes it clear that the motif is only the occasion of the
phenomena which are of real interest to the painter. The stacks are the constant, but
Monet is pursuing the variable: the shifting effects of light and atmosphere. In making
these effects so dramatically visible, however, he has gone well beyond any idea of
naturalism. Perspective provides a convenient analogy: in reality we do not see distant
things as small, but as far away. The mind selects, interprets and corrects the
information supplied by the eye (the process actually begins in the retina itself). In the
same way, we do not see a purple or red stack, but a yellow one in a sunset.
Monet deliberately suppresses this process of correction in order to make visihle
what we do not really see. What began as a pursuit of '!ruth' ends in a radical
subjectivism,just as the rigorous application ofempirical epistemology in the eighteenth
century led to idealism. Or perhaps it does not quite end there: for it is neo-
impressionism, with ill; 'scientific' pretensions, that represents hermetic subjectivism.
Monet goes beyond the 'retinal impression' in his pursuit of something real: but it is not
primarily landscape or any living being that interests him, it is the medium of perception
itself. Light, with all its spiritual associations, suffuses hiS later works in a quasi-
mystical presence.
Virginia Spate's comprehensive book minutely analyzes Monet's development as
an artist, and brings to her readings of the works the combination of erudition and
intimate atlunement to the aesthetic thinking embodied in each painting that she
demonstrated in her lecture to the Sydney Society of Literature and Aesth~tics
Colloquium last year. The book is a considerable achievement and will no doubt remain
the basis of future studies of Monet. It is also beautifully produced and illustrated.
Perhaps because it is so hard to define, Professor Spate is particularly concerned
with Monet's relation to his cultural and political environment. That relation is, as will
already be evident, complex and very ambiguous. Professor Spate shows. for exampl~,
that while his style-his pictorial language-speaks of disintegration, his subject-
matter evokes stability and the family and domestic enviroruncnt that he personally
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required. The fragmentation of his style represents the acceleration and mechanical
determination of urban time, reducing the look to the glance. and all encounters to the
casual and random. Yet almost all his painting was done in the country; in Argenteuil
be deliberately concealed the encroachments of industrialization. and he later moved
even furtber away, to rural Givemy; finally, and above all. his pictures were not based
on the casual glance. but increasingly on a prolonged and repeatt:d searching for the
wboleness of a moment.
Professor Spate sbows that the quest for wholeness was integral to Monet's painting
from the beginning. Colour, tone and light were always its basis, but in the earlier work
images offamily life-an analogue of wholeness in the realm of personal experience-
were also of fundamental importance. They almost disappeared from his later work. as
he eliminated from his art everything but the essentials.
All this still leaves us with many difficulties. Monet appears to he on the one hand
a critic of modem urban, industrial and bourgeois experience. and on the other. the
consummate bourgeois with his family. house and garden. He is the single-minded
artist, painting day after day with the discipline of an ascetic; and yet he is also the astute
businessman playing off one dealer against another. promoting the myth that all his
work is done en plein air. willing to show with insignificant society painters if it will
attract society collectors... What are we to conclude? Perhaps for one thing that all
artist, especially in a modem economic envirorunent, leams to divide and insulate his
creative being from the other self that haggles in the marketplace (although slll'h
division, especially in its more acute forms. must inevitably be injurious to his art).llul
also that from Baudelaire onwards, the 'modernist' has not been one who loves mo<k 1'1\
life, but one who is at the least deeply critical of it; 'modernism' itself, in its various
aspects, is largely a protest against the modern world. Monet's art can be understood
as a flight from that world. but also as the search, through time itself. for a transcendent
and timeless reality.
Chrisrvpher Allen
Richard Freadman and Seumas Miller, Re.thinJcing Theory: A Critique of
Contemporary Literary Theory and an Alternative Account, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
One shouldn' tjudge a book by its introduction. I wish. all the same. that the introdu<.:tioll
to this book were better written than it is.With its doggedly neutral passives. its
obligatory 'he/she' and its fashionably imprecise 'as such', together with its rather
naive declarations of allegiance ('We ourselves are wholly committed to social
justice'), it ends up sounding rather too like a combination of a thesis abstract and a
politically correct manifesto. Which is a pity, since the book as a whole is an important
and a timely one.
This is a book which seeks to inject new life into the traditional conception of a
'humanist literary criticism', to see it as consistent 'both with theory and with social
emancipation'(p.195), and to protect literature and the idea of literature from
the efforts of the dominant 'theory paradigm' to dissolve both them in parti<.:ular and
'the real world' in general. Freadman and Miller deliherately dissociate themselves
from those who are 'against theory' in general and set out systematically to rescue
'substantial conceptions of the human subject', 'the referential power of language and
of literary texts' and 'substantive discourses of value, both moral and acsthctic' from
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the attack on such notions Ily a hyllrid-derived from 'on the one hand, anti· humanist
(principally Althusserian) Marxism and, on the other, (post-) Saussurean language
theory (principally Saussure, Derrida and, in a somewhat different mode,
fooucault)'(p.4)---which the authors christen 'constructivist anti-humanism'. They
expound, summarize and argue patiently and meticulously; and they expose
contradictions, inconsistencies and weaknesses painstakingly, dispassionately and
without malice. (I myself would prefer a little more malice, particularly when the
generosity strikes me, as it occa~ionally does, as merely polite.)
The more obvious and recurrent of such weaknesses include: the caricatures, straw
men and polemical historical distortions of Belsey and Dcrrida; the failw-e to address
'the problem of how to maintain a substantive notion of historical actuality whilst
conceding the groundlessness and fictiveness of discourse' (p.49): the exemption of
certain canonical texts 'from the rigours of analysis' (p.49) or from the universal
condition whereby texts supposedly have no power to report referentially on human
affairs or to do anything other than express an obfuscating ideology (pp.1511 fn; the
espousing of a self-contradictory anti-humanism 'in which political change is required
to achieve ends that correspond to values that, at anotller level of theorising, have been
renounced' (p.70); and the reduction of the persisting self to trace and the consequent
commitment to a notion of the persisting self while purporting to reject such a notion
(p.152). Most generally of all, the authors righlly draw attention to 'the notably
stereotyped natw-e of much deconstructive criticism and its habit of reducing the
particularity of this or that text to mere evidentiality; to the status ofevidence for a priori
claims about indeterminacy, metaphoricity and so forth' (p.137).
My parenthesis a paragraph back may have seemed merely gratuitous. But the
characteristic dispassionateness of the authors' analysis is, 1 think, related to a more
general shying away from the kind of treatment of 'constructivist anti-humanism'
which would take more centrally into account its psychology as well as its logic:
the voracious egos of these dead authors are only too potently alive. headman and
Miller note that 'certain featw-es' of 'constructivist anti-humanism' are 'subliminally
totalitarian in tendency' (p.9). They are indeed. Eagleton, for instance,
characteristically writes that 'the linguistic is always [my italics] at base the politico-
linguistic' (p.85). All things might well be political but some things are less so than
others: if they weren't we wouldn't need the word political. It's the adolescent need
for the power and authority of an all-embracing philosophy which at the same time
supposedly calls all power and authority into question to which the absolutism of
'constructivist anti-humanism' consistently appeals. Deconstruction, write headman
and Miller. 'has no logical purchase on radical political sentiment or practice' (p.
120). That might well be true but 'logic' cannot in the end be abstracted from the
manifestation of that logic-{)r illogic-in the psychology of a particular individual
belonging to a particular culture at a particular time.
Which is why, though 1am wholly in sympathy with their dislike of the relativism
of 'constructivist anti-humanism', 1 find Freadman's and Miller's particular quarrel
with relativism throughout the book somewhat less than satisfactory. And why. too, 1
am more sympathetic than they are to a version of 'literature' and of 'literary criticism'
which sees them as to some extent at any rate necessarily 'against theory'. On page 62
they offer. in support of their argument against relativism and the non-referential
nature of fiction, the hypothetical example of 'a feminist no vel... in which the implicit
assertion in the fiction that historically women have been exploited is undeniably true'.
It is impossible to imagine any actual novel of substance in which the existence of such
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an 'undeniable truth' would not be rooted in a whole contexl of other relaled and
sometimes conflicting truths. And the complexity of the conception of truth and of
morality to which the novel in this respect bears witness-what Lawrence calls its
'subtle inter-relatedness' -is continuous with the conceplion ofthes!: mailers implicit
in any complex history. For though a novel or a complex history might in a sense agree
with Freadman and Miller (p.63) that it was 'morally wrong' lu treal blaclu; as slaves,
they would also, I taJce it, give us some more than merely abstract version of the moral
'goods' (such as loyalty, for instance) which were arguably inseparahle from those
moral wrongs. To a greater or lesser extent, in other words, the 'position' of art on moral
matters, like the position of a complex history, seems to me necessarily tragic rather
than ideulogical, and relativist rather than absolute.
Ofcourse the practice ofliterary criticism involves, as the authurs of this bouk show
themselves, in their last paragraph, to be intelligently aware, a process of selection and
generalization of the specific imaginative truths implicit in a work of art; and the extent
to which that selection and generalization is judged to be partial or denaturing in any
particular instance will always be a matter of dispule. But Freadman and Miller don't
always seem to me to have a secure enough hold on the notion that moral 'ideas' are nOl
abstractable from a wurk of literature but arc dramatized and embodied in iLs very
texture, in lhe interrelatedness of thought and feeling within it. (Or perhaps, sin.:e lhe
discussion of The Prelude on pp. 154-55, for instance, is a very fine piec!: of criticism,
the problem is caused by the impossible allempt to combine, in ajoint work, 'the skills
of a philosopher and a literary studies person'.) And this limitation in their thinking
about literature is continuous with their allempt (which I applaud) to restore a
conception of the substantive self without sufficiently distinguishing between the
substantive authorial self-the self manifested and embodied in the work of art-and
the substantive biographical self-the real person who wrote the poem or novel ur
whatever.
On page 201, for instance, they talk casually of 'the "views" which the author
wishes to espouse in the work' and on page 214 they speculale that 'T. S. Eliot in The
Wa.He Land is arguably intending to influence the reader into taking a jaundiced view
of sexual experience'. To impute an intention to influence or to uncover a view which
an author wishes to espouse is to imply the existence uf a consciuus authorial self
separate from and prior to the work of art itself but at the same time present in and
deducihle from it. And it is precisely such a misconception of the nature of the aUlhurial
self-a self which, as I see it, is conlinuous with but distinct from the hiographical sdf
which cannot be recovered-that has led to the denial of auth01ial presence, uf a
substantive self, in the first place.
"Ibis tendency to sec mural 'ideas' rather too frequently in terms of the conscious,
swnmarizable ethical commitments of an author beyond rather than emhodied in the
work of art manifests itself. too, in Freadman's and Miller's practical criticism: of
Wordsworth in Chapter 5 and of Adrienne Rich's 'The Insusceptibles' and Saul
Bellow's MrSammler's Planet in Chapter? The discussion of Rich's poem is sensitiw
to the workings of the poetry. Nevertheless it tends to reduce the poem's 'ethical
concerns' to its generalizable preference of one mode of being to another: 'the !:thical
commendation of experiential daring and openness over an incurious docility, and of
intimacy over the consolations of mere companionship' (p.234). ror me. th!: 'elhkal'
substance of the poem consists, ralher, in its benign but not complacent capacllY
imaginatively to celebrate both the natural 'lustres of the surruner dark' emhraced hy
the (presumably young) lovers and the 'artificial lighl' 10 which an older and !.:ss
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adventurous, more domestically inclined 'we' consign themselves-neither reluctantly
nor enviously. How else make sense of the unself-consciously decent hwnan concern
for others ('No thought of them' is subtle) which, in the last two lines, ensures that the
returning lovers will not stumhle in the dark?
That such an account of the poem might be seen as renecting my own conservati ve
sympathies---closer in time as I am to 'we' than to the 'Iovers'-while Freadman's
and Miller's points to their (elsewhere openly avowed) more radical or progressivist
commitments. suggests the continuing difficulty, which this book in the end can do little
to resolve, of separating 'the object as in itself it really is' (in this case the poem) from
the wayan individual reader sees that 'object'. Obviously I would need more space than
I have here to justify my own reading of the poem. But I'd nevertheless want to argue
both that the 'object' that I am seeing is the 'object' as it is in some sense actually
'there' - and more so than the object that they are seeing-and that, at the same time,
that 'object' has no significant 'real' existence other than in my inevitably but by
no means exclusively individual interpretation of it. Which brings me to the bearing
of Lcavis's idea of the'third realm' both on Freadman's and Miller's enterprise in
particular and on 'theory' in general. I
On p.IO rreadman and Millerquote as 'positlvely prophetic' Northrop Frye's 1957
observation that 'the absence of systematic criticism has created a power vacuum, and
all the neighbouring disciplines have moved in'. Garry Watson's 1977 book The
Leavises. the "Social" and the Left provides an alternative explanation of this 'power
vacuum' which attrihutes it, not to the 'absence of systematic criticism'. but to the
consistent refusal to engage with Lcavis. And that refusal extends. in my view, to his
later, more 'theoretical' thinking about the natureofliterature, oflanguage and of works
of art in The Uving Principle.
Freadman and Miller both draw on Leavis's account in 'Literary Criticism and
Philosophy' of the distinctive nature of literature and of literary criticism (Spivak, for
instance, is accused of imposing 'her own conceptions on the text' and ignoring the fact
that reading is 'an heuristic activity', pp.14I,14R) and. predictably and conventionally,
critici7.e Lcavis's essay for its supposed repudiation of a 'theory' which it both contains
and contradIcts in practice (p.43). But the point at issue is surely the eXTenT in any
particular instance rather than the general existence Of a 'predetermination' of which
they themselves rightly accuse Spivak. Leavis's essay is not so much a 'theory' as an
account of what is typically involved in the actual experience of reading a poem and of
apprehending the 'ideas' embodied in it. It is in his exchanges with F. W. Bateson and
later-in a more sustained way-in The Uving Principle, that Leavis might reasonahly
be said to be theorizing that experience. And that 'theorizing'-which Freadman and
Miller ignore~mergesout of and is consistent with the earlier account of the actual
pmress of reading literature in a way that Freadman's and Miller's own theorizing
often doesn't and isn't. (Perhaps, again. one can atlribute this to the book's being a
joint production.)
For their own theorizing often draws on empiricist assumptions and distinctions--
between the 'sulljective' and the 'objective' or 'meaning' and 'truth'-which Leavis's
later work is intent on challenging. They claim on pp. 172-73, for instance. 'that just
as the notion of truth hrings with it the notion of an objectively existing world, so the
notion of meaning brings with it the notion of a subject.. Meaning ... is inherently
suhjective'; and they see 'truth' in fiction, typically, in tenns of a relation between the
'imaginary world' of fiction and the 'ordinary spatio-temporal world' (p.227) For
Leavis 'meaning' and 'truth' are neither 'inherently subjective' nor inherently objecti ve
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but are continually being collaboratively created and recreated in the 'third realm'-
'the realm of that which is neither private and personal nor public in the sense that it can
be brought into the laboratory or pointed to' -to which literature, language, truth and
meaning all belong: the crucial point, for him, concerns the way in which we at once
find meaning in and give meaning to both Friedman's and Miller's 'worlds'
by an act of the imagination.
This is a valuable book which has a mucb better claim to a place in courses in
'Literary Theory' than many books that currently appear there. It will, I hope, help in
the restoration of Common Sense. But there are many moments in it when rreadman
and Miller seem in danger of identifying the 'real' with the ohjectively verifiable
alone and 'truth' with the facts of science. And that's what got us into this mess in the
first place. What I'd really like to see is a 'theorized' contemporary version of
Wordsworth's Preface to the Lyrical Ballads:
Aristotle ... has said, that Poetry is the most philosophic of all writing: it is so: il~
object is truth, not individual and local. but general, and operative: not standing
upon external testimony, but carried alive into the heart by passion: truth which is
its own testimony, which gives competence and confidence to the tribunal tu
which it appeals, and receives them from the same trihunal.
R. L. P. Juckson
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